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Subnational government’s budget deficit 
targets in a Monetary Union: the 
Spanish case 1995-2010
En el presente artículo analizamos los factores que explican los saldos fiscales de las CC.AA. 
Los resultados empíricos sugieren que los objetivos de déficits a largo plazo no deberían dis-
tribuirse linealmente entre las regiones y que no debería esperarse que estos objetivos se 
cumpliesen en el mismo horizonte temporal. Asimismo, los resultados sugieren que los 
Acuerdos de financiación deberían ser rediseñados para evitar que el Estado pudiese trans-
ferir déficit a las CCAA. Finalmente, los resultados sugieren que debería haber una mayor 
coordinación presupuestaria para evitar que las CC.AA sorteasen las restricciones de gasto y 
deuda a través de su sector público instrumental.
Artikulu honetan, autonomia-erkidegoetako zerga-saldoak esplikatzen dituzten faktoreak 
aztertuko ditugu. Emaitza enpirikoek iradokitzen dutenez, epe luzeko defizit-helburuak ez 
lirateke linealki banatu beharko eskualdeen artean, eta ez litzateke espero beharko helburu 
horiek denbora-muga berean betetzea. Emaitzek pentsarazten dute, halaber, finantziazio-
hitzarmenak birdiseinatu beharko liratekeela, Estatuak autonomia-erkidegoetara defizitik ez 
transferitzeko. Emaitzetatik ondorioztatu daiteke, azkenik, aurrekontu-koordinazio handiagoa 
egon beharko litzatekeela, autonomia-erkidegoek gastuen eta zorren murrizketak ez saihesteko 
beren sektore publiko instrumentalaren bitartez.
We set out an analysis of the factors that explain subnational budget balances. Ours results 
suggest that long run deficit targets should not be distributed linearly across Autonomus 
Communities, and cannot be expected to be fulfilled in the same time-horizon. More 
important, financing agreements should be redesigned in order to avoid the central 
government having the opportunity to transfer its deficit to Autonomous Communities. 
Finally, more budgetary coordination is needed in order to prevent that Autonomous 
Communities circumvent central governments fiscal rules using their public entities.
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1.  IntrODUCtIOn
The economic downturn that started in 2007 in some countries in the Eurozone 
(Spain, Greece and Portugal, among others) activated mechanisms to control budget 
deviations. These mechanisms, arising from the implementation of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, introduce, among other restrictions, deficit targets to be achieved by the 
aggregate of all public administrations in a country within a specific timeframe.
In Spain the distribution of deficit targets is not the result of a bargaining pro-
cess but, instead, is a unilateral decision by the Central Government (CG hereafter, 
see section 3.2 for a more detailed description of this process). Given that the deficit 
The authors wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions du-
ring the evaluation process.
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target for each country refers to the aggregate of all levels of government, there is 
some kind of trade-off to what concerns deficit targets among the CG and Regional 
Governments (RGs1) because the larger the deficit assigned to subnational govern-
ments, the lower the remaining deficit target for the CG. However, this trade-off re-
garding deficit targets does not prevent RGs to exceed their targets because the CG 
cannot force them cutting public expenditure or increasing taxes in the short run.
The consequence of such a mechanism may have been irrelevant during 2002 
and 2008 because RGs’ budgets were balanced during this period due to expanding 
fiscal revenues. However, during the 2009-2012 period, the Spanish CG assigned it-
self most of the deficit target (71% in 2012), while the CG was responsible only for 
54% of total expenditure (including social security and unemployment subsidies). 
In addition to that, the CG linearly distributed the deficit target across regions. This 
meant that all regions, regardless of their economic position in their own economic 
cycle, were expected to achieve the same deficit target in the same year. 
Some efforts have been devoted to analysing the opportunity to implement fis-
cal rules or increase the level of tax autonomy in decentralized economies and their 
impact on subnational fiscal balances. 
However, most contributions are based on the hypothesis that the CG acts as a 
social planner that fixes fiscal rules, budget restrictions etc. for RGs in order to cor-
rect some possible externalities of RGs’ fiscal balances on aggregate deficit targets. 
Nevertheless, little attention has been devoted to one of the main issues about sub-
national fiscal deficits, which is how to allocate deficit targets across different levels 
of government and how to distribute them within each level of government, given 
that the deficit target fixed by the EU refers to all public authorities in a country. 
Within this framework, the question can be posed in a different manner - who de-
cides which level of government is going to bear the cost of expenditure cuts and tax 
increases?
In this paper we analyse the determinants of subnational governments’ fiscal 
balances and we try to shed some light on the opportunity of a CG deciding unilat-
eraly the distribution of deficit targets across public administrations and linearly 
among subnational governments. We run our analysis based on Spanish data for the 
period 1995-2011.
Previous analyses of the impact of fiscal rules in theoretical and empirical papers 
present several additional shortcomings. On the one hand, indexes for fiscal rules, 
budgetary institutions etc. are frequently based on the existence – or not- of a regu-
lation that develops them. However, we argue that what matters is not if such rules 
exist but whether they are appropriately designed and implemented. On the other 
1  We use Regional Governments (RG), Subnational Governments (SG) or Autonomous Communities 
(AC) indistincly in this paper.
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hand, a similar problem occurs when we measure tax autonomy. Tax autonomy in-
dexes may be based on an inaccurate interpretation of the financing agreements that 
determine the distribution of resources for RGs. However, we argue that some legal 
technicalities may distort the effective degree of tax autonomy. For instance, in 
Spain there are some restrictions on altering shared taxes (VAT and Excise Taxes) 
and some RG’s own taxes, which although RGs receive all revenues derived from 
them they do not manage them effectively. Finally, the literature avoids dealing with 
another technicality which relates to who estimates tax revenues from shared taxes 
at period t-1 to be delivered at period t, and what is the mechanism to correct possi-
ble deviations (see section 4.2 for further discussion). 
Although such details are neglected in most empirical analysis, due to the lack of 
data available, they are not harmless, at least from the perspective of Spanish ACs. 
Although during 2010-2013 ACs implemented the largest cuts in public expendi-
ture, even so most of them were not able to achieve their targets, which have been 
largely surpassed. This non-fulfilment of deficit targets has been used by critics of 
the Spanish process for decentralization who suggest that RGs are the main source 
for fiscal instability and that there is too much decentralization and too excesive tax 
autonomy in Spain. 
Several additional contributions are to be remarked. First, the literature has omit-
ted considering to what extent CG’s fiscal position determines RG’s budget balances. 
Our results suggest that RGs’ budget balances depend on the size of the deficit run by 
the CG and on the mechanism that allows the CGs to decide the amount of resources 
to be received by RGs (see section 4.2 concerning transmission mechanisms). Our re-
sults suggest that the CG may transfer part of its deficit to RGs. Second, the literature 
has not considered RGs strategic behaviors against CG fiscal rules. We show that RG’s 
may act strategically by using public entities’ budget deficits in order to circumvent 
fiscal rules designed by the CG. Finally, another contribution of our paper is a meth-
odological one because we work with cyclically adjusted balances based on our own 
estimates of output gaps and revenue elasticities for each AC. The previous literature 
has dealt with short term budget deficits and considering revenues and expenditure 
elasticities computed on country data. However, long term deficit targets fixed by the 
EU refer both to structural as well as current balances.
To sum up, the main contribution in this paper is that we try to solve these 
shortcommings by computing new variables that consider those technicalities that 
characterize fiscal relationships among different levels of governments.
From a policy-maker’s perspective, our results suggest that long term deficit tar-
gets cannot be distributed linearly across ACs (this idea is supported also by Fernan-
dez and Lago 2013) and cannot be expected to be fulfilled in the same time-horizon 
because financing agreements generate asymmetries among ACs (regardless of ACs’ 
position in the economic cycle) and, more important, that financing agreements 
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should be re-designed in order to avoid the CG having the opportunity to transfer 
its deficit to ACs (beyond the expected effects due to AC’s cycle) and ACs’ having 
the opportunity to circumvent CG’s fiscal rules. 
In section 2, we briefly review the literature analysing the factor that explains 
national and subnational fiscal balances. In section 3 we describe the distribution of 
deficit targets across public authorities and across RGs in Spain. We also provide the 
level of achievement of deficit targets. In section 4 we describe briefly the Spanish 
process of decentralization and the mechanism used by the CG to distribute fiscal 
resources to subnational levels of government. In section 5 we estimate AC’s cycli-
cally adjusted budget balances and in section 6 we estimate the determinants of such 
fiscal balances. Finally, section 7 contains our conclusions.
2.  rELAtED LItErAtUrE
There are extensive contributions analysing the relationship between fiscal defi-
cits and fiscal federalism issues, such as the role of RGs in the law-making process, 
the default-bailout game, etc. As far as the latter point is concerned, the links be-
tween bailout expectations for RGs to the regional tax base and its connection to the 
deficit bias were analysed by von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996). Their argument is 
that the CG cannot credibly commit itself to a no-bailout policy if the revenues of 
subnational levels of government are not generated from fiscal sources that they 
have direct discretion over. On the contrary, if revenues largely come from own tax 
sources the CG can avoid bailouts by requiring subnational governments to increase 
taxes under their control. 
Von Hagen (2005) states that an overspending problem may occur when subna-
tional governments receive resources from a national common pool -for example, 
through intergovernmental fiscal transfers- which creates vertical externalities (see 
Wildasin 1997, Goodspeed 2002; see also Bordignon 2006 for a survey on this litera-
ture). According to Rodden et al. (2003) hard budget constraints make subnational 
governments internalise the total costs of their policies. On the other hand, soft 
budget constraints motivate subnational governments to increase expenditure with-
out facing the full cost of their decisions. Therefore, fiscal responsibility is an instru-
ment aimed at achieving that subnational governments internalise the cost of the 
public goods and services they supply, which ought to avoid overspending.
Additionally, there are a large number of contributions that analyse the role of 
soft budget constraints. Some of them focus their analysis on the design and effec-
tiveness of fiscal rules (see von Hagen 2006, Hallerber et al. 2007 and  Debrun 2008), 
concluding, from a country specific perspective, that institutional and political 
background do have a clear effect on the effectiveness of budget constraints. Other 
contributions find evidence for subnational bailouts from a descriptive case study 
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(see Foremny, 2013, for a survey) and most of them conclude that higher degrees of 
tax autonomy harden budget constraints. Finally, Roden (2002, 2006) find that ver-
tical fiscal imbalances do have a positive effect on subnational governments’ deficits. 
This conclusion is also reached at Foremny (2013) who concludes that deficits of 
subnational governments in federations can be avoided through tax autonomy. 
From an empirical perspective, the literature has defined an extensive number 
of factors that aim to explain national and subnational fiscal balances (see Argimón 
et al., 2012, for a complete survey). These factors can be grouped into two catego-
ries. On the one hand, we find political and institutional factors such as the compo-
sition of majorities, the existence of budgetary institutions, the role of political busi-
ness cycles, partisanship, etc. On the other, we find macroeconomic factors such as 
economic inequality, regional income level, the population structure, interest rates, 
asset prices, inflation, economic cycles, etc.
In the particular case of Spain, most efforts have been devoted to analyse the de-
terminants of AC debt levels (Hernández de Cos et al., 2013) as well as the existence 
of bailout effects (Sorribas, 2011). Another strand of the literature, which is not so 
highly developed, has analysed the factors that explain fiscal deficits and borrowing 
levels at subnational level in Spain. Lago-Peñas (2005) found a relationship between 
the level of transfers received by the ACs and their expenditure and budget deficits, 
suggesting that fiscal deficits were a rational decision by ACs given that financing 
agreements between CG and AC governments did not provide sufficient resources 
to finance their needs. Barrios and Martinez (2013) find similar results in a paper in 
which Spain, Germany and Canada are analyzed. These results are very close to 
those previously obtained by Monasterio and Suarez Pandiello (1993) and García-
Milà and McGuire (1990). A similar approach is followed in Perez-Cucarella (2013), 
where the authors analyse the fiscal balances of Spanish ACs and they try to deter-
mine whether deficit and debt levels are due to their greater tendency to spend or to 
insufficient income. Following a different approach, Argimón et al. (2012) found 
that fiscal rules did not have any significant effect on ACs’ fiscal balances during 
1984-2004 and also that tax autonomy contributes to controlling budget deficits, al-
though such tax autonomy causes fiscal deficits to depend largely on business cycles. 
Finally, Mussons (2013) confirms the procycality of subnational fiscal deficits and 
the positive effects of tax autonomy on fiscal balances (1987-2010). 
In this paper we argue, following Foremny (2014) in a cross-country study and 
Roden (2002, 2006), that ACs’ subnational fiscal deficits in Spain are influenced by the 
decisions of the Spanish CG. In this sense, Molina-Parra and Martínez-López (2015) 
in the context of yardstick competitition models, for the Spanish case, found that fiscal 
imbalances at the federal tier of government encourage public deficits of regional gov-
ernments. Complementary to the previous authors, we focus our analysis on the role 
of institutional design on fiscal deficits, we do so by emphasizing the transmission 
mechanisms through which the CG might influence RG’s fiscal deficits.
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We argue that the Spanish CG affects subnational fiscal deficits through differ-
ent mechanisms: i) the CG decides the distribution of deficit targets between the CG 
and the other levels of government and, therefore, it decides who is going to bear 
the burden of budget adjustments, ii) the CG unilaterally decides subnational gov-
ernment’s deficit targets which traditionally have been fixed linearly (2002-2012) or 
discretionary for 2013 and, iii) the CG unilaterally estimates the amount of resourc-
es that ACs are going to receive from shared taxes and transfers, which, as suggested 
in the data, based on financial agreements that introduces significant assymmetries 
among ACs and allows the CG to underestimate these resources and transferring 
part of its fiscal deficit to ACs (see section 4 for further details on transmission 
mechanisms and see also BBVA 2015 and López-Casasnovas et al. 2014).
Our paper follows a similar approach to the literature that analyses the determi-
nants of subnational fiscal balances. However, we introduce several changes that 
provide new results. First, we work with structural deficits rather that with current 
fiscal balances. Second we introduce new variables that improve the definition of tax 
autonomy. Third, we introduce a variable that captures transmission mechanisms of 
deficit from CG to RGs mentioned in the previous paragraph. Fourth, we intend to 
capture the possibility of strategic behaviours of RCs against CG fiscal rules. Finally, 
we extend our analysis to consider the last period of economic downturn (2009-
2012) and the characteristics of the new financing agreement (2009) between the 
CG and ACs.
As mentioned above, another difference in our paper with respect to previous 
literature is that we work with subnational government’s cyclically adjusted balance 
(we also refer to them as structural balance) that requires estimating ACs’ output 
gaps and ACs’ revenues elasticities individually. In addition to the fact that the EU 
fixes long term deficit targets based on structural deficits, we argue that, in order to 
test the relevance of financing agreements, tax autonomy and the role of the CG, it 
is more appropriate to work with budget deficits once cyclical effects have been ad-
justed. If a robust relationship exists between budget deficits and our explanatory 
variables this would suggest that the mechanism of devolution and/or the financing 
agreements between CG and ACs may have been designed incorrectly.
3.  thE prOCESS OF FISCAL DECEntrALISAtIOn In SpAIn AnD thE 
ImpLEmEntAtIOn OF FISCAL rULES
3.1. Fiscal rules in Spain
ACs and Local Governments (LGs) in Spain are empowered to take on debt, as 
long as they respect certain limits. The basic rule is that debt repayment and interest 
cannot exceed 25% of the ACs’ and LGs’ current revenues. In addition to this, au-
thorisation from the CG is required to arrange credit operations abroad and for 
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debt issuance. Nevertheless, credit operations with national banks and short term 
credit operations (less than one year) do not require such authorisation.
With regard to the rules governing ACs’ budget balances, these have evolved 
over different periods. In the first period, from 1992 to 2001, the CG-assigned budg-
et deficits and debt to each AC were based on bilateral negotiation for a two-year 
period (known as the Budgetary Consolidation Scenarios).
In the second period, from 2001 to 2005, under the Budget Stability Law (BSL) 
the CG assigned a single limit, in terms of budget deficit, for all ACs. No individual 
targets were settled for each region therefore they faced the same deficit target re-
gardless of their cyclical position.
Finally, the reform of BSL in 2006 stated that CG and ACs would be able to 
adapt their deficits and surplus targets to their economy’s cyclical positions. As a 
consequence budget surpluses were to be achieved if the growth rate of the economy 
exceeded 2% and deficits were allowed if the economy’s growth rate was below 0%. 
The allocation of deficit targets between the CG and the ACs was decided unilateral-
ly by the CG and the same deficit target was assigned to all ACs regardless of the re-
gion’s economic position. Thus, effective deficit targets were significantly different 
across ACs because the mechanism that allocates fiscal revenues across ACs intro-
duces significant asymmetries across regions (see López-Casasnovas et al. 2014), re-
gardless of the evolution of the AC’s fiscal basis. 
We should point out that since the implementation of the BSL, some ACs have 
demanded a different distribution of deficit targets between CG, ACs and LGs based 
on a real bargaining process at different levels of government. In addition to this, 
they demanded an asymmetric allocation of deficit targets among ACs. Demands 
were rejected by the CG arguing that it was impossible to implement a distribution 
of deficit targets that satisfied all ACs’ and LGs’ interests. 
However, in 2013 the CG assigned individual short term budget deficit targets 
to ACs. This allocation was not transparent and was not based on any rule known 
ex-ante. Apparently, it seems that they were decided unilaterally by the CG based on 
AC budget deficit at t-1. Nevertheless, long term budget deficit targets remain uni-
form and ACs’ budgets must be balanced by 2020.
In spite of AC demands, it seems that the result of implementing the BSL has 
been rather positive, because data indicates that ACs’ budget deficits and debt levels 
remained under control (debt/GDP ratio reached its maximum at 6.5% in 2005 and 
its minimum at 5.7% in 2007). However, one cannot argue that this is due to the 
implementation of fiscal rules because from 2001 to 2007 CG and ACs revenues in-
creased continuously. 
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3.2. Deficit targets in Spain, 2008-2012
Table 1 provides the distribution of deficit targets, decided unilaterally by the 
CG2, across all levels of Administration in Spain during 2008-2012. The first column 
indicates the deficit target for each administration for each year. The second column 
shows the proportion of the deficit target assigned to each administration. The third 
column provides the final deficit achieved by each administration. For 2012 we have 
introduced an additional column that represents the proportion of total public ex-
penditure managed by each level of administration.
Data in table 1 suggests that deficit targets were evenly distributed across differ-
ent levels of administration in favour of the central administration. For instance, in 
2012 when the proportion of expenditure managed by the CG is above the average 
for the last 10 years due to the increase in unemployment subsidies, data shows that 
although CG is responsible for 56% of total expenditure, it self-assigns 71% of total 
deficit. Data also shows that CG has demanded larger cuts in deficit targets from lo-
cal and regional administrations. From 2010 to 2011 local and regional administra-
tions were required to reduce their deficit targets by 50% and 46%, respectively, 
while the effort of the CG was 17%.
The target that is assigned to ACs is the same for each region, in terms of GDP, 
regardless of their position in the cycle, or regardless of any initial economic factors 
that influence their cyclical deficit.
However, the problem in Spain is not only that the CG unilaterally decides the 
distribution of deficit targets but also that the mechanism according to which RGs 
obtain their resources presents some pitfalls which allow the CG to transfer deficit 
to ACs. 
Finally, we must remark the rapid increase in the level of debt related to public 
entities, which are not considered when computing Public Administrations’ fiscal 
deficit. According to the Bank of Spain, public debt of these entities represented 
2.5% GDP in 2000 while in 2010 represented 5%.
2  Regarding deficit targets for ACs, the CG raises a proposal to the Consejo de Politica Fiscal y Financi-
era. Although this proposal is discussed in the Council, it is not subject to negotiation. It must be appro-
ved and although 17 regions and two autonomous cities are represented the CG holds the majority. As a 
consecuence, this suggests that there is no real multilateral bargaining process, as the Council is desig-
ned as an instrument for validating CG initiatives. At the most, the political bargaining process might be 
bilateral, with some regions, and in most cases it would simply be validated multilaterally ex-post by 
majority voting.
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4.  thE prOCESS OF FISCAL DECEntrALISAtIOn In SpAIn
4.1. Financing agreements between Cg and rgs: increasing tax autonomy
Very often it is said that the Spanish Autonomous Communities model has a le-
vel of decentralisation that goes far beyond that of many countries with federal-type 
regimes. This might be true with regard to the level of decentralisation of public ex-
penditure (regional and local governments are responsible for a large share of the 
total expenditure, 44% in 2012) but not with regards to tax autonomy. Attention 
should be paid to the effective responsibility assumed by ACs because the CG fixes 
minimum public goods and services that must be provided by ACs that clearly res-
tricts ACs’ autonomy in managing such responsibilities.
The main characteristic of the Spanish process of decentralisation is that the le-
vel of responsibilities that were devolved to ACs was rather asymmetric at the begin-
ning, although asymmetries had been almost eliminated by 2013. Still, some respon-
sibilities have not been devolved yet to all ACs such as penitentiary, justice, etc. 
Another asymmetry concerns the origin of ACs’ fiscal revenues. There are two 
different groups of regions. On the one hand, there are two regions (named Foral 
Regions3) that manage and collect the most tax revenues and transfer resources to 
the CG in order to cover the services that the Spanish government is providing in 
these regions. On the other hand, there are the rest of ACs, which receive transfers 
(direct transfers or derived from shared taxes) from the CG. RGs in this group of re-
gions also have some revenues that are obtained from own taxes. 
The financing agreements that rule such mechanism for the second group of re-
gions since 1987 are rather complex. For simplicity, we refer only to the main cha-
racteristics of such agreements:
First, apparently there has been a significant increase in fiscal co-responsibility, 
for two reasons: i) because the mechanism has moved from a transfer based to a 
shared tax process, ii) because ACs have been increasing regulatory power on inco-
me tax, which is a shared tax, and on some of the taxes that were transferred to them 
but that were considered as own taxes. Therefore, it seems that tax autonomy has 
gradually been increasing.
However, some characteristics of the mechanism distort effective tax autonomy. 
This is due to the fact that the CG has traditionally opposed the creation of new taxes 
by ACs, even when these new taxes did not overlap with CG taxes and even though 
ACs had the regulatory capacity to create and regulate them. Additionally, the fact that 
there are some shared taxes does not mean that ACs can manage or regulate them. For 
3  There are also several differences among Navarre and the Basque Country, because in Basque Coun-
try fiscal authority corresponds to the Diputaciones forales, which transfer part of their resources to the 
Basque Government.
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instance, the 2009 agreement stated that ACs shared Income Tax (50%), VAT (50%) 
and Excise Duties (58%) but the possibility of regulating or managing VAT and Excise 
duties is non-existent (with the exception of the tax rate on the duty of petrol). 
In figure 1 we present the different measures of tax autonomy. In the first co-
lumn we show the distribution of fiscal revenues between taxes and other sources of 
income for the 2011 financial year. We observe that 82% on their income is obtai-
ned from tax revenues. However, this proportion decreases significantly when we 
consider only those taxes over which regional governments have some kind of regu-
latory power (they can decide on tax bases, or tax rates, tax credits, etc.), because 
only 46% of total revenues (including Income Tax) come from taxes that can be re-
gulated by ACs. Finally, the picture changes dramatically when we consider the pro-
portion of revenues obtained from taxes that are managed by ACs. If this is the case, 
as shown in the third column, one can observe that only 10% of ACs’ revenues 
come from taxes that are entirely managed, and very often entirely ruled, by them.
Figure 1.  TAX AUTONOMY FOR THE AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITIES.  
 2011 (%)
Source: Own elaboration.
Second, the mechanism has moved from a bilateral bargaining process based on de-
volution costs to a mechanism in which ACs’ needs were estimated according to some 
«objective» variables (beginning in 1987). However, the results of any attempt to com-
pute «objective» necessities have been systematically counteracted by the implementa-
tion of a guarantee clause that stated that any modification to the mechanism could not 
result in a decrease of the funds that each AC received prior to the modification (known 
as the statu quo effect). This vertical equalization transfers distorts the initial redistribu-
tion because it actually means that those regions that were «over-financed» will continue 
in that position, and that some regions that should significantly improve their funding 
according to the model did not do so as much as they should. This result comes from 
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the fact that the theoretical necessities of the regions are somehow linked to the estima-
ted cost of devolution. To sum up, the final allocation of resources has no systemic rela-
tionship either in terms of any sort of needs assessment of the regions or regarding their 
fiscal capacity or income levels (see López-Casasnovas et al. 2014).
Third, since 2009 there exists a powerful horizontal mechanism of equalization ai-
med at ensuring that all regions have the same resources per capita in order to cover 
the costs of ‘similar’ levels of provision of those goods and services that are considered 
to be essential services (education, health and social services). Nevertheless, this initial 
redistribution of resources should allow, in principle, the maintenance of certain diffe-
rences in revenue-raising capacities because that horizontal equalization is implemen-
ted on 75% of total tax revenues (plus a lump sum transfer from the CG).
Table 2. REGIONAL FISCAL RESOURCES PER CAPITA (average=100). 2012
 Tax Revenue (1) Total resources pc (2) Total resources pc* (3)
 Index Ranking Index Ranking Index Ranking
Madrid 134,2 1 94,6 11 99,80 10
Balearic Islands 122,5 2 100,1 9 100,20 8
Catalonia 118,6 3 98,7 10 99,50 11
Aragon 115,1 4 116 4 110,40 5
Cantabria 114,5 5 125,1 1 125,20 1
Asturias 107,8 6 112,7 6 108,40 5
La Rioja 103,5 7 120 2 118,00 2
Castilla-Leon 100,8 8 115,8 5 108,00 6
Valencia 93,9 9 94 13 95,60 14
Galicia 92,3 10 110,8 7 104,30 7
Castilla-La Mancha 85,3 11 103,4 8 99,00 9
Murcia 83,9 12 93,7 14 95,70 13
Andalusia 79,7 13 94,4 12 96,50 12
Extremadura 76,6 14 117 3 111,80 3
Canary Islands 41,8 15 90,2 15 87,00 15
Total 100 100 100
Coef. of Variation 0,252771 0,10986 0,09503
Notes: 1) Tax Revenues relate to all taxes in the system that allocates resources among Autonomous 
Communities; 2) Total resources relates to the final distribution of financing resources - taxes plus transfers - 
among ACs for the same level of responsibilities; 3) pc* refers to per capita adjusted population.
Source: Generalitat de Catalunya.
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The effect of such Vertical (Fondo de Suficiencia) and Horizontal (Fondo de Ga-
rantía) Equalisation Funds can be observed in table 2. The coefficient of variation of 
the initial territorial distribution of tax revenues doubles that of the final allocation 
of fiscal resources across regions, regardless of whether it is calculated considering 
population or the adjusted population4, once the Equalisation Funds have been im-
plemented. This suggests that these transfers are highly redistributive.
Finally, we observe that Equalisation Funds introduce a significant change in the 
relative position of each region. Some regions with the highest fiscal capacities that 
contribute the most to horizontal regional transfers (through Fondo de Garantía) in 
per capita terms, obtain fiscal resources pc that are well below the average, and vice 
versa. Needless to say that these differences cannot be explained by differences in the 
resources that should allow provision of similar levels of public goods under similar 
fiscal effort levels but they are due to the statu quo effect.
As result, given that deficit targets are distributed uniformly, it seems obvious 
that ACs do not have the same opportunities to achieve their target.
4.2. Estimation of tax revenues on shared taxes by the Central government
Up to now, we have described the main characteristics of financing agreements 
succinctly. Nevertheless, financing agreements, and in particular since 2002, contain 
some technicalities that have a significant effect on ACs’ revenues. These technicali-
ties suggest that CG could reduce part of its deficit by transferring it to ACs. 
This technicality refers to how the CG calculates the resources that are going to 
be transferred to regions with respect to shared taxes and transfers. The CG estima-
tes revenues for shared taxes and transfers at t-1 and notifies these estimates to ACs 
by October t-1. The CG will transfer all estimated resources regardless of whether 
their calculations were achieved, or not, during period t. Then, at period t+2, once 
real revenues are known, the CG compensates ACs for the difference (results might 
also be in favour of the CG).
Apparently, this procedure suggests that the CG has not incentives in underesti-
mating RGs’ transfers because at t+2 it should compensate RGs with additional re-
venues. However, short run effects matter in real politics.
In table 1 we showed that the CG reduced its deficit from 9.5% in 2009 to 5.72% 
of GDP in 2010. It is obvious that fiscal transfers to RGs should be reduced as far as 
tax revenues in shared taxes dropped significantly. However, data in table 3 suggest 
that a significant portion of the reduction of CG’s fiscal deficit in 2010, 2011 and 
2012 might have been accomplished by underestimating the resources that should
4  Adjusted population is based on real population which is modified by considering several factors that 
explain different costs of provision of public goods and services (population density, age, dispersion, etc.).
Joan Rosselló, andReu sansó
294
Ekonomiaz N.º 89, 1.º semestre, 2016
T
ab
le
 3
.  
B
A
L
A
N
C
E
 B
E
T
W
E
E
N
 E
ST
IM
A
T
E
D
 R
E
SO
U
R
C
E
S 
(t
)-
 V
A
L
ID
A
T
E
D
 R
E
SO
U
R
C
E
S 
(t
+
2)
 2
00
7-
20
11
 
(t
ho
us
an
d
 e
ur
o
s)
C
C
.A
A
B
al
an
ce
 
20
07
%
 g
D
P 
20
07
B
al
an
ce
 
20
08
%
 g
D
P 
20
08
B
al
an
ce
  
20
09
%
 g
D
P 
20
09
B
al
an
ce
 
20
10
%
 g
D
P 
20
10
B
al
an
ce
 
20
11
%
 g
D
P 
20
11
C
at
al
o
ni
a
81
6.
57
5
0,
41
%
-6
90
.7
17
-0
,3
4%
-2
.4
78
.1
08
-1
,2
7%
91
6.
50
7
0,
47
%
84
7.
00
0
0,
43
%
G
al
ic
ia
39
3.
02
9
0,
73
%
-5
73
.7
58
-1
,0
2%
-1
.6
00
.5
92
-2
,9
2%
36
1.
68
2
0,
66
%
30
1.
00
0
0,
55
%
A
nd
al
us
ia
1.
42
6.
17
2
0,
98
%
-1
.4
75
.9
78
-0
,9
9%
-4
.6
37
.4
39
-3
,2
4%
28
9.
59
2
0,
20
%
44
2.
00
0
0,
31
%
A
st
ur
ia
s
11
7.
32
5
0,
51
%
-1
71
.1
62
-0
,7
2%
-5
88
.0
64
-2
,5
9%
14
3.
75
1
0,
63
%
11
6.
00
0
0,
51
%
C
an
ta
b
ria
11
4.
65
6
0,
86
%
-1
25
.0
21
-0
,9
0%
-3
64
.2
26
-2
,7
3%
10
5.
21
0
0,
79
%
35
.6
00
0,
27
%
R
io
ja
55
.0
22
0,
71
%
-4
6.
31
4
-0
,5
8%
-2
02
.9
74
-2
,5
9%
61
.6
98
0,
79
%
14
.0
00
0,
18
%
M
ur
ci
a
19
7.
10
1
0,
73
%
-1
60
.5
15
-0
,5
7%
-5
81
.9
74
-2
,1
4%
10
4.
39
8
0,
38
%
13
30
00
0,
49
%
V
al
en
ci
a
51
5.
56
9
0,
50
%
-6
35
.6
85
-0
,6
0%
-1
.7
07
.2
19
-1
,6
8%
72
7.
55
1
0,
71
%
92
30
00
0,
91
%
A
ra
g
o
n
20
1.
58
9
0,
61
%
-1
71
.8
38
-0
,5
0%
-7
21
.6
46
-2
,2
2%
15
6.
20
1
0,
48
%
11
90
00
0,
37
%
C
as
til
la
-la
-M
an
ch
a
36
6.
87
0
1,
03
%
-2
65
.1
53
-0
,7
2%
-1
.0
33
.6
94
-2
,8
9%
17
0.
54
3
0,
48
%
12
00
00
0,
34
%
C
an
ar
y 
Is
la
nd
s
47
1.
19
3
1,
13
%
-3
40
.0
39
-0
,7
9%
-1
.1
02
.3
58
-2
,6
7%
-4
6.
60
9
-0
,1
1%
75
.0
00
0,
18
%
E
xt
re
m
ad
ur
a
18
4.
28
7
1,
05
%
-2
52
.3
50
-1
,3
9%
-7
64
.3
78
-4
,2
7%
92
.7
42
0,
52
%
35
.8
00
0,
20
%
B
al
ea
ric
 Is
la
nd
s
34
.6
43
0,
13
%
-1
62
.0
51
-0
,6
0%
-1
78
.3
77
-0
,6
8%
42
9.
05
7
1,
62
%
52
0.
00
0
1,
97
%
M
ad
rid
81
9.
83
1
0,
44
%
15
.0
69
0,
01
%
-1
.3
36
.2
23
-0
,7
0%
1.
27
2.
22
5
0,
67
%
33
0.
00
0
0,
17
%
C
as
til
la
-L
eo
n
36
2.
22
6
0,
64
%
-4
43
.6
07
-0
,7
6%
-1
.4
39
.1
81
-2
,5
5%
31
7.
55
1
0,
56
%
26
60
00
0,
47
%
To
ta
l
6.
07
6.
08
8
0,
63
%
-5
.4
99
.1
20
-0
,5
5%
-1
8.
73
6.
45
3
-1
,9
4%
5.
10
2.
09
9
0,
53
%
4.
27
7.
40
0
0,
44
%
(*
) A
 p
o
si
tiv
e 
va
lu
e 
re
p
re
se
nt
s 
th
at
 a
t 
p
er
io
d
 t
 t
he
 C
G
 u
nd
er
es
tim
at
ed
 r
ev
en
ue
s 
to
 b
e 
tr
an
sf
er
re
d
 t
o
 r
eg
io
na
l g
o
ve
rn
m
en
ts
. T
he
se
 r
es
o
ur
ce
s 
ar
e 
tr
an
sf
er
re
d
 a
t 
t+
2.
So
ur
ce
: O
w
n 
el
ab
o
ra
tio
n.
Subnational government’S budget deficit targetS in a monetary union: the SpaniSh caSe 1995-2010
295
Ekonomiaz N.º 89, 1.º semestre, 2016
be transferred to ACs (equivalent to 0.53% of GDP). One could argue that these de-
viations are due to unpredictable errors because the CG overestimated also fiscal 
transfers in 2008 and 2009, meaning that ACs had to pay back this excess revenue. 
The CG allowed them to pay back within ten years. However, in terms of deficit, the 
impact was computed on 2010 and 2011 ACs’ accounts, which allowed an additio-
nal reduction in CG’s and caused an increase in ACs’ fiscal deficits.
Data in table 3 also indicates that the «error» in the estimation of fiscal transfers 
to ACs is not uniform across regions because they are evenly distributed. This pro-
blem existed in the previous model but it increased since 2011, because those re-
gions (basically regions with an above average tax capacity) receive additional resou-
rces aimed at providing them average revenues pc. In 2010 the CG decided that 
these regions would not receive any advance payment of these resources in 2011, but 
in 2013 (the same occurred in 2012 and 2013). However, this argument does not 
apply for 2008 and 2009 where larger assymmetries exist.
Finally, there is another technicality that favours the CG. In 2010 some reforms 
increasing consumption taxes (VAT and Excise Duties) were introduced. Formally, 
regions received additional resources associated to these taxes, but effectively the CG 
reduced Vertical Equalisation Transfers by that amount (see Table 4). In addition to 
that, it must be remarked that the procedure used by the CG to estimate tax revenue 
increases due to changes in the economic position of each region or due to tax rates 
increases is not available to ACs’, which again introduces the possibility that tax re-
venue estimates are biased in favour of the CG.
Table 4.  ESTIMATED REVENUES, 2012-2013. AUTONOMOUS  
 COMMUNITIES
 2012 2013 Var Var%
Income Tax 33.588,80 33.161,29 -427,51 -1%
V.A.T 23.368,59 26.781,93 3.413,34 15%
Excise Duties 11.048,28 12.245,76 1.197,48 11%
Vertical Transfers (*) 6.928,38 1.966,30 -4.962,08 -72%
Horizontal Transfers (**) 6.801,64 8.534,27 1.732,63 25%
Total 81.735,69 82.689,55 953,86 1%
(*) Fondo de Suficiencia Global, (**) Fondo de Garantía. 
Source: Central Government Budget, 2012-2013.
Altogether, this data suggests that the CG has the possibility to transfer part of 
its deficit to ACs by underestimating the resources that regions should receive for 
period t and transfer the difference to t+2.
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5.  EStImAtIng CYCLICALLY ADJUStED bALAnCES In SpAIn
In general, the literature that estimates the determinants of fiscal balances is based 
on current deficits as a dependent variable and introduces variables that control for bu-
siness cycle. Instead, in this paper we use structural balances as our dependent variable.
Structural balances are estimated according to the methodology implemented 
by the European Commission (see European Commission 1995), the OECD (see 
Giorno et al., 1995) and the European Central Bank (see Bouthevillain et al., 2001). 
Structural balances are estimated in two steps. The first step estimates the cycli-
cal position of the economy by measuring its deviation from its «normal» growth 
path. In a second step, the impact on the budget of the cyclical position is estimated 
on the basis of fiscal elasticities. In our paper such elasticities are estimated based on 
an econometric model5. Multiplying the deviations from the reference path by the 
estimated fiscal elasticities yields the corresponding cyclical components of the vari-
ous budgetary items. Finally, cyclically adjusted balances are then computed by sub-
tracting the cyclical component from the actual budget balance.
In the next sections we explain briefly how output gaps and tax and expenditure 
elasticities are estimated as well as the results obtained. 
5.1.  Output gap
5.1.1. Methodology
Our series refer to the period 1989-2011. Although it is not a large span, it cov-
ers a complete cycle (1994-2008), part of an expansion cycle (1989-1993) and part 
of a recessive one (2009-2011).
Output gaps are estimated based on the methodology used in Giorno et al. 
(1995), European Commission (1995) and Bouthevillain et al. (2001) that consists 
of applying the Hodrick-Prescott6 filter (HP) to the series of real GDP (the log of)7. 
The HP filter parameter was set as l=100, the standard value with annual data. As in 
5  In the appendix we explain the methodology that we implemented in order to obtain large GDP seri-
es for each Autonomous Community (both at constant and current prices) that are required for out-
put-gap and elasticities estimates.
6  The HP filter is a symmetric centred moving average except at the extremes of the series, where there 
is a bias problem in estimating both the trend and the cyclical component. Given the special interest in 
the end of the series when studying the budgets’ cyclical component, to avoid the bias problem we ex-
tended the GDP series logs with 4-steps ahead forecasts as in the European Commission (1995) metho-
dology. This way the estimated HP trend and cyclical component of the GDP at the last year’s available 
data is based on a symmetric centred moving average filter.
7  Giorno et al. (1995) also consider a Cobb-Douglas production function for the private sector to com-
pute the potential output. However, this alternative cannot be implemented in our paper due to the lack 
of data available.
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the previous references, we used automatic univariate procedures for forecasting the 
GDP series, which can easily be reproduced by other researchers8.
Once the trend component of real GDP for the period 1989-2011 was obtained 
for each Spanish region, the output gap was computed as
    
          Yt  — Y t*
GAPt  = ———— ,
                        Y t*
where Yt is the real GDP in year t and Y
*
t  is the trend of the real GDP for year t esti-
mated with the HP filter. 
5.1.2. Output gap estimates
Estimated output gaps for all ACs during 1989-2011 (see figure 2) present the 
following characteristics.
First, it seems that there is an almost perfect synchrony in output gaps for all 
ACs. Output gap estimates present a positive sign for most ACs during 1989 and 
1992 and also 2000-2008, while during 1993-1998 and 2010-2011 the output gap 
presented negative values. However, during 2007 and 2008 all ACs present a cyclical 
position well above their trend (between 4 and 6 percentage points above), just be-
fore the economic downturn. From 2000 on, the sign and size of the output gap al-
lowed the expansion of fiscal revenues and public expenditure, in spite of the fact 
that the increase in tax revenues was based on unstable fiscal basis (property devel-
opment, etc.).
Second, in 2011 all ACs present output gap values that are between 2 and 3.5 
percentage points below their trend GDP (the exception being Andalusia which is 
4.5% below).
Finally, it can be noted that during the period 1989-2001 there were differences 
among  the cyclical positions of ACs although they were very stable (except in 1995 
and 1998). However, from 2002 differences among ACs decrease significantly, to a 
minimum in 2005, and increase thereafter until 2008, when dispersion in ACs out-
put gaps decreased to the estimated levels for 1998.
Altogether, it seems that regional economies in Spain, as expected, present simi-
lar cyclical positions although there are significant differences among regions, which 
suggests that economic shocks on the Spanish economy do have asymmetric effects 
on regional economies.
8  We used the TRAMO program automatic process to identify the orders of the univariate ARIMA mo-
dels for the real GDP in Spanish regions. Subsequently, using these univariate models, we proceeded to 
forecast the series until 2015. Then the extended series with predictions were filtered using the HP filter 
to obtain the trend component.
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5.1.3. Income elasticities and cyclically adjusted balances
In general, the estimation of cyclically adjusted balances takes into account pub-
lic revenues and expenditures. As far as public expenditure is concerned, only gov-
ernment transfers to households, in particular those aimed at covering costs related 
to unemployment, are considered. In this paper we do not consider such transfers 
because ACs are not responsible for unemployment benefits, the CG is. This means 
that in our estimates original series of public expenditure are considered as structur-
al (or cyclically adjusted).
Another distinctive feature of our estimates is that, although the standard pro-
cedure consists of estimating a weighted average of components revenue elasticities 
(personal taxes, corporate taxes, social security contributions and indirect taxes), 
the particular structure of ACs’ revenues, and the lack of data, brings us to estimate 
revenue elasticity for each AC considering all sources of income9. It seems obvious 
that ACs’ revenues from own taxes and revenue from shared taxes are affected by 
the cyclical position of their economies. However, due to the mechanism that regu-
lates CGs’ transfers to ACs, it can be accepted that they are sensitive to the economic 
cycle (they depend on the evolution of CG’s tax revenues but also on AC’s tax reve-
nues and on AC’s tax revenues in comparison to all ACs10. 
Once revenue elasticities are estimated, the cyclical component of budget reve-
nue and expenditures is obtained by multiplying the output gap with the budgetary 
sensitivity. The cyclically adjusted balances are then computed by subtracting the 
cyclical component from the actual budget balance.
Data in figure 3 indicates that cyclically adjusted balances can be grouped into 
three different periods. The period that covers 1995-2007 is characterised by a de-
gree of dispersion (the standard deviation of budget deficits ranges from 0.0027 to 
0.0070) that is rather low, considering that during this period all ACs alternated 
negative with positive output gaps. Something similar occurred during 1989-1995, 
however this period presents larger dispersion values in structural balances, with 
standard deviation ranging from 0.015 to 0.0038. Finally, there is a third period that 
covers 2008 to 2011 during which all regions present negative output gaps. In this 
last period, dispersion among ACs is again rather large, ranging from 0.011 to 0.019.
9  We have also estimated similar models for each ACs’ sources of revenues (central government trans-
fers, shares of direct taxes and indirect taxes) but due to the continuous changes to the financing system, 
manifest in structural changes, model estimates were not satisfactory.
10  Revenue elasticities are estimated using an expression similar to that in Bouthevillain et al. (2001)
∆ln Rjt  =  αj +  βj ∆lnGDPjt + Aj + εjt ,
where Rjt are total revenues at moment t for ACj (revenues from own taxes, shared taxes and CG’s trans-
fers), GDPjt refers to nominal GDP. Aj is a set of dummy variables associated with the particular nature 
of financing agreements between CG and ACs, and εjt is the error term. αj and βj are the parameters to 
be estimated, with βj being the sensitivity of AC’s revenues to GDP. ∆ is the lag operator, so that ∆lnxt 
=lnxt-lnxt-1 is the approximate growth rate of variable xt
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Figure 3.1.  STRUCTURAL DEFICIT/GDP. AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITIES,  
 1989-2011. Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, Balearic Islands
Figure 3.2.  STRUCTURAL DEFICIT/GDP. AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITIES,  
 1989-2011. Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castilla la Mancha, Castilla León
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FFigure 3.3.  STRUCTURAL DEFICIT/GDP. AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITIES,  
 1989-2011. Catalonia, Extremadura, Galicia, Rioja
Figure 3.4.  STRUCTURAL DEFICIT/GDP. AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITIES,  
 1989-2011. Madrid, Murcia, Navarre, Basque Country, Valencia
 
Source: Own elaboration.
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As a consequence, data suggests that there are significant differences among 
AC’s cyclically adjusted fiscal balances, and it is rather unlikely that these differences 
can be attributed to the cyclical position of each region. 
In the next section we analyse which factors explain such differences. Given that 
it seems that the economic cycle is the same for all regions (although with different 
intensities) it is interesting to analyse to what extent ACs’ differences in fiscal bal-
ances are explained by institutional and political variables, as well as by the financ-
ing agreements that determine resources to be received by ACs.
6.  thE DEtErmInAntS OF rgS CYCLICALLY ADJUStED bUDgEt 
bALAnCES
6.1. methodology 
In order to run our empirical analyzis, we use the methodology that is standard 
and that has been used in the different articles mentioned in the literature that anal-
yses similar issues based on Spanish data. It is worth mentioning that there are other 
contributions related to the analysis of political economy data. In particular, in Beck 
and Katz (2011) and Beck (2001), the authors suggest that the analysis of panel data 
models should be addressed using OLS with panel correct standard errors rather 
than GLS. In addition to that, the authors suggest that dynamics could be modelled 
via lagged dependent variables (which is what we do in this paper). 
In particular, we estimated the level model in first differences, by applying GMM 
(Arellano and Bond 1990), using lagged regressors as instruments. In order to check for 
first-order serial correlation in levels, we looked for second-order correlation in differ-
ences. The problem with the Arellano-Bond test is that it depends on the assumption 
that N is large and, as suggested by Rodman (2009): «applying it to panels with N=20, 
seems worrisome». In our dataset N takes the value 17. We mention this apparent pit-
fall because for some definition of the dependent variables (structural primary deficits 
over GDP and structural deficit over non financial instruments) in some of the estima-
tions M2 is significant, which suggests that there might be a autocorrelation problem in 
two-step GMM. Nevertheless, this problem is not present for one-step GMM. 
We also present the results of the Sargan test, which tests the validity of the ove-
ridentification restrictions and is asymptotically distributed as a Chi2. However, as 
reported by Roodman (2009), the test is subject to errors that depend on the num-
ber of instrumental variables. In fact, we found significant differences in this test de-
pending on whether we estimated one-step or two steps GMM. In particular, one-
step GMM rejects the null hypothesis of valid overidentification restrictions, while 
two-step GMM corrects such bias.
However, none of these problems exist when we use cyclically adjusted balance 
(also denoted as structural balance) over GDP as our dependent variable.
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6.2. Explanatory variables
There are an extensive number of variables that have been used as explanatory 
factors to ACs budget balances. Traditionally they have been classified into two 
groups. Table 5 shows the variables that we used in our estimates.
Table 5.  DETERMINANTS OF STRUCTURAL FISCAL BALANCES IN SPANISH 
 ACs
Description Value
Expected Sign on 
Budget Balances
INSTITUTIONAl VARIABlES
TotalResources FA
Total Revenues pc obtained by 
ACs from each FA
Euros Negative
FA
Financing agreement for the 
Autonomous Communities 1995-
1996, 1997-2001, 2002-2008 and 
2009-2010
1/0 ?
Tax Autonomy
Ratio Revenues from Own taxes 
and shared taxes (excluding excise 
taxes and VAT) over Non Financial 
Income
% ?
Transfers
Ratio Transfers received by ACs 
over Non Financial Income
% ?
DebtPublicSector/GDP % Negative
CGDeficit/PIB CGBudget deficit over GDP % Positive
CGDeficit (t-1) CGBudget deficit over GDP at t-1. % Positive
POlITICAl VARIABlES 
PolCoincidence
Coincidence between political 
parties governing ACs and the CG
1/0 Negative
Right Right-wing ruling parties at ACs 1/0 Negative
Left Left-wing ruling parties at ACs 1/0 Positive
Nationalist Nationalist ruling parties at ACs 1/0 Positive
ECONOMIC VARIABlES
Interest Rate
Ratio Interest payments over  
Total debt
% Positive
Source: Own elaboration.
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In the first group, economic factors are included. Variables such as economic 
cycle, interest rates, income per capita, income inequality and, to a lesser extent, in-
flation and asset prices, have traditionally been considered as potential determinants 
of budget balances. In this paper we omit most of these variables because they tend 
to capture the position of a Government’s fiscal balance according to cycle and, as 
we mentioned, we are working with structural fiscal balances, thus correcting for its 
cyclical component. Nevertheless, we introduce the estimated interest rate because it 
captures the cost of the total debt issued by a government at moment t. We expect 
that higher interest rates might increase budget deficits because it is very unlikely 
that unexpected increases in interest rates at period t be compensated with a unex-
pected reduction in public expenditure or an increase in tax rates (the potential rev-
enues of tax rates increased unexpectedly at period t are rather small) while the 
budget is being executed.
The second group of variables is made up of those referring to political factors. 
Political instability, ideology and electoral-cycles are very often used as explanatory 
variables to budgeted balances. As an explanatory variable, we introduced Political 
Coincidence, which refers to the coincidence (or not) in the ideology of ruling par-
ties at ACs and the CG (it takes the value 1 if there is coincidence and 0 otherwise). 
We expected that if there is political coincidence the CG will favour related ACs by 
transferring more resources to them or by financing their capital expenditure, while 
unrelated ACs may have to finance capital expenditure with their own resources. 
Another political variable is the ACs political orientation of their ruling parties. It is 
commonly expected that nationalist and left-wing oriented ruling parties tend to 
present higher budget deficit levels than right-wing oriented parties.
Finally, there is a third group of variables that refer to institutional factors, 
which is where the reader will find our main contribution to the literature. The ex-
istence of budgetary institution and variables related to the implementation of fiscal 
rules are the most commonly used variables in the literature. Nevertheless, we argue 
that the existence of these institutions does not guarantee that fiscal rules are imple-
mented or that there is coordination among different levels of governments. In 
Spain a budgetary institution exists (see footnote 1), but instead of fostering institu-
tional coordination it is fostering institutional disloyalty (see Lopez-Casasnovas et 
al. 2014). Two different groups of variables are introduced concerning institutional 
factors. We try to go beyond traditional variables computed based on general defini-
tions concerning the level of decentralization, tax autonomy, etc. and we compute 
new variables that consider some of the technicalities that characterize fiscal rela-
tionships between CG and RGs that we detailed in section 4.
On the one hand, we introduce two variables that are associated with potential 
strategic behaviours of CG and ACs. First, we introduce the ratio of ACs’ Public 
Debt in relation to their Public entities over GDP. Our argument is that fiscal rules 
on ACs can be circumvented by deviating AC’s fiscal deficit to those ACs’ public en-
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tities that are not considered when computing AC’s fiscal balance. This explains, in 
Spain, the fact that there has been an enormous increase of such public entities, and 
their debt. Every time the CG introduces more restrictions on such entities, ACs 
(and also the CG itself) created new entities with different legal status. Therefore a 
negative sign is expected for this variable. Second, we introduced CG’s Budget Defi-
cit. We argue that CG can be tempted to reduce its deficit by transferring it to ACs. 
We introduced two lags in this variable. A positive sign is expected in this variable, 
which means that the larger the CG budget deficit, the more tempted the CG will be 
to transfer it to ACs. Alternatively, one may argue that this is an endogenous varia-
ble, because the CG may generate budget deficit by increasing the amount of re-
sources aimed at relieving ACs’ budget deficits. However, as we mentioned earlier, 
the financing agreements between the CG and ACs prevent this occurring, because 
this would increase ACs’ budget deficits at t+2. In addition to this, as we have al-
ready mentioned, the CG unilaterally controls the process through which ACs re-
ceive their resources and also the allocation of deficit targets between and within dif-
ferent levels of government. 
On the other hand, we introduce some variables relating to the financing agree-
ments between the CG and AC. In this group of variables we include the Total Re-
sources per capita available to each AC (a negative sign is expected, meaning more 
resources – regardless of whether they come from taxes or transfers - available to 
ACs to allow fiscal deficits to be reduced). This variable is measured considering es-
timated revenues on shared taxes and transfers to ACs from the CG at period t plus 
the compensation received by ACs due to the difference of estimated revenues and 
effective revenues at t-2. 
We also introduced a dummy variable with the intention of capturing the speci-
ficity of each financing agreement (FA1, FA2, FA3 and FA4). Given that renovation 
of financing agreements has tended to increase the degree of tax autonomy, this var-
iable might be interpreted as a proxy for tax autonomy. Additionally, we introduced 
two different direct measures of tax autonomy. The first one is the Total Transfers 
over Total non Financial Revenues ratio. The second one was measured based on 
Total Revenues from Own Taxes (plus Income tax, which is a shared tax and which 
can be slightly regulated by ACs) over Non Financial Revenues. No expectations 
were made in relation to the sign of such variables because, while some authors sug-
gest that more tax autonomy is expected to make ACs more responsible (a positive 
sign would be expected for FA1, FA2 and FA3 in comparison to FA4), some others 
argue that with more tax autonomy ACs’ revenues largely depend on the tax basis 
evolution, while ACs expenditure are rather structural11. 
11  They are considered as structural because most of ACs public expenditure is devoted to health, edu-
cation and social services which are characterised by being rather rigid in relation to the business cycle. 
In addition to this, we must remember that the CG fixes public services that must be provided compul-
sorily by ACs to their citizens.
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A dummy variable was introduced for each region, which is particularly interest-
ing for those regions with special status (Navarra, the Basque Country and the Ca-
nary Islands) and a variable that measures the different degrees of devolved respon-
sibilities (as provided for in articles 143 and 150 of the Spanish Constitution). 
Given that we introduce so many variables, it is very likely that multicollinearity 
among the regressors exists. In order to control for multicollinearity we analyzed the 
matrix of correlations and we identified some variables such as Transfers, Interest 
rate, Sf3, and Total Resources. Given that there is not a standard solution to this 
problem, we proceeded estimating each of the regressions introducing all variables 
and then we did the same exercise eliminating those variables that were supposed to 
introduce multicollinearity. In any of the estimates deleting Interest rate and Trans-
fers, which are not significant in most estimates, we did not observe that the estima-
tions changed significantly, this is why we present the estimates introducing these 
variables. To what concerns Sf3 and Total Resources, they are highly correlated, but 
Sf3 is a dummy variable and it seems that there is no relationship between both vari-
ables. As expected, results did change slightly, but we decided to maintain both vari-
ables in order to avoid the biased caused by omitting relevant variables.
 6.3. results
We used three different definitions of cyclically adjusted budget balances. Re-
sults are presented in table 6 and the results for each definition of the dependent 
variable refer to one-step and two-steps GMM.
Although we have calculated many regressions, we only present some of the re-
sults in this section because very often the variables were not significant, or because 
we dropped them due to multicollinearity problems (this occurred when we intro-
duced cross effects among Transfers/GDP and Financing Agreements, for instance).
Estimations by two-step GMM (columns 3 and 4) are the best because the Sar-
gan test accepts the null hypothesis of valid overidentification restrictions and be-
cause M2 indicates that there is no second-order correlation. These are the estima-
tions that we are going to comment in the following paragraphs.
The most interesting result is that estimates confirm that CG budget balance, at 
period t-1, is significant and it has a positive effect on ACs’ budget balances. This su-
ggests that the CG can affect ACs’ budget balances, which is an issue that was not pre-
viously considered in the literature, by transferring its deficit to ACs. However, one 
could interpret that this result is due to the fact that AC’s budget balances cause CG’s 
budget balance because the CG has to bail out ACs’ governments. Nevertheless, this is 
clearly not what occurred during the 2008-2011 period and it is something that finan-
cing agreements prevent from occurring because any deviation in favour of ACs at pe-
riod t is necessarily adjusted at period t+2. In addition to that it is obvious that if Fi-
nancing Agreements are based on shared taxes, if tax revenues decrease, so will 
transfers from the CG. However, we must remind that we are working with structural 
fiscal deficits, meaning that the cycle effect is already considered.
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A second result suggests that ACs may behave strategically when fiscal rules are 
tightened because the variable DebtPS/GDP is significantly negative. This indicates 
that ACs might try to prevent fiscal rules by increasing the budget deficits (and 
debt) of the institutions that have a specific legal status. This interpretation is also 
validated based on the data that shows significant increases in the number of public 
entities, precisely during the period when BLS was implemented.
Table 7.  MAIN STATISTICS
Obs -0,004176 Std Dev. Min Max
StructualDeficit/GDP 289 0,0096828 0,0098349 -0,0456574 0,0329434
Structural PrimaryDeficit/GDP 289 0,4847751 0,0364597 -0,0426008 0,1900578
DebtPS/GDP 289 0,4934328 0,6321068 0 3,3
Transfers 289 0,358736 0,2413824 -0,2767024 0,9693747
OwnTaxes/NFR 289 0,358736 0,2205676 0,0694184 0,9742702
InterestRate 289 0,0555339 0,0262841 0,0025248 0,1702213
Interest Payments 289 0,0260824 0,0250556 0,0007897 0,1821598
TotalResourcesFA 289 1837,72 974,4939 198 4232
CGDeficit 289 -0,0002406 0,0002768 -0,00093 0,00012
Source: Own elaboration.
A third result relates to political variables. It seems that only Political Coinci-
dence has some impact on AC’s budget balances, suggesting that the CG might fa-
vour related ACs by transferring more resources to them or by financing their capi-
tal expenditure. On the contrary, it seems that there is no clear empirical evidence 
that the ideology of ruling parties explains different levels of budget balances among 
ACs, which suggests that right-wing oriented ruling parties also generate fiscal defi-
cits as much as left-wing and nationalist oriented ruling parties do.
Fourth, with regard to the effects of financing agreements on ACs budget bal-
ances we find that the Transfers/Total Income ratio, which is a measure of tax au-
tonomy, does not have any impact on ACs budget balances. Another measure of tax 
autonomy is implicit in the dummy variable that refers to each of the financing 
agreements. Given that tax autonomy has been increased in each of the financing 
agreements, one could interpret, as it is, that FA4 is the one in which tax autonomy 
reached its maximum level. Accordingly, a negative sign in FA1, FA2 and FA3 sug-
gests that agreements characterised by providing low levels of tax autonomy had 
negative effects on ACs budget balances (budget deficits were lower under FA1, FA2 
and FA3), in comparison to FA4. Alternatively, one could make the interpretation 
that tax autonomy has a positive effect on ACs budget deficits. This result is the op-
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posite of that in Argimón et al. (2012), who found a positive role for the degree of 
fiscal co-responsibility on regional fiscal balances. Their interpretation of that result 
is that there is a positive association between a greater restraint in public accounts 
and a higher degree on regional control over revenue and expenditures12. Neverthe-
less, our result is not unexpected because while ACs expenditures are rather struc-
tural (public expenditures are rigid with significant cuts in the short term), tax au-
tonomy makes ACs more dependent on the evolution of their tax basis13. 
Finally, our estimates indicate that the amount of effective resources that Fi-
nancing Agreements provide to ACs has a negative effect on ACs budget balances. 
Although the coefficient is very small, it seems that the larger the amount of re-
sources effectively available to ACs, from Financing Agreements, the lower the ACs’ 
budget deficits. 
Even though for one step GMM estimations the Sargan test rejects the null hy-
pothesis, results indicate that almost all variables maintain their significance, with 
the exception of Political Coincidence. 
Regarding the other definitions of our dependent variable, we must point out that 
two step GMM estimates are very poor because none of the variables are significant. 
Although one-step GMM estimates (columns 5 and 6, and 9 and 10) show similar re-
sults to those arising when Structural Balances/GDP is considered as our dependent 
variable these results should be taken with some caution because the Sargan test rejects 
that overidentifying restrictions are valid. The only difference is that when we take 
Structural Primary Balance as our dependent variable, variable Transfers have a posi-
tive impact on ACs’ budget balances, a result that would suggest that more tax auton-
omy is associated with lower deficit levels, a result that coincides with that in Argimón 
et al. 2012. In addition, the variable associated with left-wing oriented ruling parties 
indicates that AC’s ruled by these parties may present higher levels of budget deficits. 
7.  COnCLUSIOnS
In this paper we set out analysis of the factors that explain subnational budget 
balances. To sum up, the main contribution in this paper is that we use new varia-
bles that try to solve the shortcomings that characterize traditional definitions of 
variables that do not consider those technicalities that characterize fiscal relation-
ships among different levels of governments in Spain.
From an empirical perspective our main findings are the following. First, our re-
sults show that ACs’ budget balances depend on the size of the deficit run by the CG 
12  We must remind that Argimón et al. (2012) analysed the period 1984-2004, thus excluding part of 
the period in which the Spanish economy presented positive, large growth rates and the period (starting 
in 2009) where the economic downturn started. In addition to this, they do not analyse the effects of the 
financing agreement settled in 2009, which presents the largest level of tax autonomy for ACs.
13  We also crossed FA and Transfers, however some of the variables were deleted due to multicolinearity 
problems and for the ones that remained in the estimates we did not obtain any significant coefficient.
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and on the mechanism that allows the CG to decide the amount of resources to be re-
ceived by ACs. Our results suggest that the CG can transfer its deficit to ACs. Second, 
we show that RG’s act strategically by using public entities’ budget deficits in order to 
circumvent fiscal rules designed by the CG. Finally, another contribution of our paper 
is a methodological one because we work with cyclically adjusted balances based on 
our own estimates of output gaps and revenue elasticities for each AC. The previous 
literature has dealt with short term budget deficits and considering revenues and ex-
penditure elasticities computed on country data. However, long term deficit targets 
fixed by the EU are both for structural balances as well as current deficits.
From a policy-maker’s perspective, several implications derive from our empiri-
cal findings. First, results suggest that deficit targets should not be distributed linear-
ly across ACs and should not be expected to be fulfilled in the same time-horizon 
because financing agreements generate asymmetries among regional governments 
(regardless of their position in the economic cycle). Second, and more important, 
that financing agreements should be re-designed in order to prevent the CG having 
the opportunity to transfer its deficit to regional governments (beyond the expected 
effects due to their own cycle). Finally, our results suggest that more budgetary co-
ordination is needed in order to prevent that ACs circumvent central governments 
fiscal rules using their public entities.
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APPENDIX
We describe the time series used to compute the output gap (real GDP) and the 
elasticities (current GDP) of the Spanish Autonomous Communities. Time series 
come from different sources and methodologies that had to be linked. The general 
criteria was to use the most recent official data from INE, the Spanish national sta-
tistical agency, and link back to the other sources and methodologies by applying 
the growth rates retrospectively. The last methodological base for regional accounts 
relates to 2008 (CRE08), and is the one used by central Government to compute pu-
blic deficit. Therefore, these series are enlarged back in order to make predictions 
and calculate the output gap (real GDP) and to estimate elasticities.
Thus, the series of real GDP for the period 1989-2011 were built linking the fo-
llowing series:
• Growth rates of the CRE08 chained volume indices covering 2009-2011. 
Data corresponding to 2009 and 2010 were provisional and 2011 was a first 
estimation.
• Growth rates of the chained volume indices of INE regional accounts with a 
methodological base in 2000 (CRE00), for 1996-2008 Data relating to 2007 
and 2008 were provisional.
• Real growth rates of the Gross Added Value for Spanish regions for the pe-
riod 1990-1995 estimated by De la Fuente (2009).
Therefore, based on year 2008, the GDP with base CRE08, which is the only defini-
tive one on this basis, forward and backward growth of rates discussed in the previous 
three points were applied. The series of GDP at current prices needed to estimate elasti-
cities were built from the CRE08 (2008-2011) retrospectively applying nominal growth 
rates of CRE00 for the period 1995-2007, and CRE86 for the period 1984-1994.
